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<inference id="lcch_0001">
<passage>On 23 June 1996, the Sunday Telegraph reported about a "secret multi-million-pound deal with the Indian government which will supply banned materials used to manufacture poison gas." Under the deal, India will build a sophisticate chemical plant at Qazvin, which will be used produce phosphorous pentasulfide, a dual-use chemical that could be used to produce chemical weapons.</passage>
<question type="YNQ">Has India built dual-use chemical production plants in Iran?</question>
<provenance type="unedited">/CountryProfiles/Iran/Chemical/index.htm.txt</provenance>
<answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="linguistic">
<response>Don't know.</response>
<because>A contract to build something does not necessarily entail that the thing was built.</because>
</answer>
</inference>

<inference id="lcch_0002">
<passage>On 23 June 1996, the Sunday Telegraph reported about a "secret multi-million-pound deal with the Indian government which will supply banned materials used to manufacture poison gas." Under the deal, India will build a sophisticate chemical plant at Qazvin, which will be used produce phosphorous pentasulfide, a dual-use chemical that could be used to produce chemical weapons.</passage>
<question type="WH">What dual-use chemical will be produced at the Indian-Iranian joint venture at Qazvin?</question>
<provenance type="unedited">/CountryProfiles/Iran/Chemical/index.htm.txt</provenance>
<answer id="1" polarity="unknown" force="strict" source="linguistic">
<response>Sodium Cyanide.</response>
<because>Sodium cyanide production is not precluded by phosphorous pentasulfide production</because>
</answer>
</inference>

<inference id="lcch_0003">
<passage>In January-February 1997, China supplied Iran with 40,000 barrels of calcium hypochlorite, a chemical-biological-radiological decontamination agent.[26]</passage>
<question type="YNQ">Has China provided Iran with decontamination materials?</question>
<provenance type="unedited">/CountryProfiles/Iran/Chemical/index.htm.txt</provenance>
<answer id="1" polarity="true" force="strict" source="linguistic">
<response>Yes.</response>
<because>Providing any amount of decontamination materials entails that some decontamination materials were provided.</because>
</answer>
</inference>

<inference id="lcch_0004">
<passage>Iran continues to deny any allegations that it is actively pursuing an offensive CW program. In 1996, it held the first regional seminar on the national implementation of the CWC in Tehran so that government authorities could familiarize themselves with their duties and obligations under the treaty.</passage>
<question type="YNQ">Has Iran denied developing CW?</question>
<provenance type="unedited">/CountryProfiles/Iran/Chemical/index.htm.txt</provenance>
<answer id="1" polarity="false" force="strict" source="linguistic">
<response>No.</response>
</answer>
</inference>

<inference id="lcch_0005">
<passage>Being one of the few countries in the world that has experienced chemical warfare (CW) on the battlefield, Iran ratified the Chemical Weapons Convention in 1997</passage>
<question type="YNQ">Is Iran a signatory to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)?</question>
<provenance type="unedited">/CountryProfiles/Iran/Chemical/index.htm.txt</provenance>
<answer id="1" polarity="true" force="strict" source="linguistic">
<response>Yes.</response>
<because>Only signatories can ratify a treaty.</because>
</answer>
</inference>

<inference id="lcch_0006a">
<passage>Desperate for hard currency to prop up its sickly regime, North Korea has demanded $1 billion a year from America to end its destabilising missile sales to countries such as Iran, Syria, Libya, Egypt and Pakistan. That demand was reportedly knocked down by the Clinton administration to a series of satellite launches and some food aid, but the potential deal still lacked a key component-how to verify that North Korea was honouring the bargain-when the Clinton team ran out of time. So missile sales still flourish.</passage>
<question type="YNQ">Does North Korean still export missiles?</question>
<provenance type="unedited">/data/www.ransac.org/Projects%2520and%2520Publications/News/Nuclear%2520News/2002/02_05_02.html</provenance>
<answer id="1" polarity="true" force="strict" source="linguistic">
<response>Yes.</response>
<because>Flourishing missile sales to other countries entails the ongoing exportation of missiles.</because>
</answer>
</inference>

<inference id="lcch_0006b">
<passage>Desperate for hard currency to prop up its sickly regime, North Korea has demanded $1 billion a year from America to end its destabilising missile sales to countries such as Iran, Syria, Libya, Egypt and Pakistan. That demand was reportedly knocked down by the Clinton administration to a series of satellite launches and some food aid, but the potential deal still lacked a key component-how to verify that North Korea was honouring the bargain-when the Clinton team ran out of time. So missile sales still flourish.</passage>
<question type="YNQ">Did the Clinton administration agree to send $1 billion a year to end the DPRK's missile sales?</question>
<provenance type="unedited">/data/www.ransac.org/Projects%2520and%2520Publications/News/Nuclear%2520News/2002/02_05_02.html</provenance>
<answer id="1" polarity="false" force="strict" source="linguistic">
<response>Yes.</response>
<because>Reducing demands implies that the original demands were not met.</because>
</answer>
</inference>

<inference id="lcch_0006c">
<passage>Desperate for hard currency to prop up its sickly regime, North Korea has demanded $1 billion a year from America to end its destabilising missile sales to countries such as Iran, Syria, Libya, Egypt and Pakistan. That demand was reportedly knocked down by the Clinton administration to a series of satellite launches and some food aid, but the potential deal still lacked a key component-how to verify that North Korea was honouring the bargain-when the Clinton team ran out of time. So missile sales still flourish.</passage>
<question type="WH">What countries has North Korea bought missiles from?</question>
<provenance type="unedited">/data/www.ransac.org/Projects%2520and%2520Publications/News/Nuclear%2520News/2002/02_05_02.html</provenance>
<answer id="1" polarity="false" force="plausible" source="world">
<response>Iran, Syria, Libya, Egypt, Pakistan</response>
<because>Countries don't usually buy and sell the same goods to the same countries.</because>   
</answer>
</inference>

<inference id="lcch_0007">
<passage>In October 2002, North Korea confirmed U.S. intelligence reports that it had a clandestine enriched uranium weapons program in violation of the Agreed Framework and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.</passage>
<question type="YNQ">Has North Korea complied with the NPT?</question>
<provenance type="unedited">/CountryProfiles/NK/index.htm.txt</provenance>
<answer id="1" polarity="true" force="strict" source="linguistic">
<response>No.</response>
<because>A party that is in violation of an agreement cannot be in compliance with the agreement at the same time.</because>
</answer>
</inference>

<inference id="lcch_0008">
<passage>In addition to aerial-delivered chemical ordnance (bombs, possibly other types of ordnance), DPRK military airfields (as of 1993) have posted a platoon of chemical defense personnel equipped decontamination and detection systems.</passage>
<question type="YNQ">Has North Korea taken steps to protect its military airfields from chemical weapons attacks?</question>
<provenance type="unedited">/CountryProfiles/NK/Chemical/51.htm.txt</provenance>
<answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
<response>Yes.</response>
<because>Posting CW personnel is one way to protect airfields (and airfield personnel) from CW attacks.</because>
</answer>
</inference>

<inference id="lcch_0009">
<passage>The continued willingness of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), the People's Republic of China (PRC), and Russia to provide Iran with both missiles and missile-related technology that at the very least exceed the intentions of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). This has been complemented, to a lesser extent, by the willingness of other nations (e.g., Libya and Syria) to cooperate within the realm of ballistic missile development.</passage>
<question type="WH">What countries have provided Iran with ballistic missiles and missile-related technology?</question>
<provenance type="unedited">/CountryProfiles/Iran/Missile/3367.htm.txt</provenance>
<answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="linguistic">
<response>Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), People's Republic of China (PRC), Russia</response>
</answer>
</inference>

<inference id="lcch_0010">
<passage>The continued willingness of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), the People's Republic of China (PRC), and Russia to provide Iran with both missiles and missile-related technology that at the very least exceed the intentions of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). This has been complemented, to a lesser extent, by the willingness of other nations (e.g., Libya and Syria) to cooperate within the realm of ballistic missile development.</passage>
<question type="WH">What Middle Eastern countries have been collaborating with Iran to develop their own ballistic missiles?</question>
<provenance type="unedited">/CountryProfiles/Iran/Missile/3367.htm.txt</provenance>
<answer id="1" polarity="false" force="strict" source="world">
<response>Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), People's Republic of China (PRC), Russia</response>
<because>DPRK, PRC, and Russia are not Middle Eastern countries</because>
</answer>
</inference>

<inference id="lcch_0011">
<passage>However, DOD has no plans to help secure three other Russian nerve agent storage sites that store 65 percent of Russia's declared nerve agent stockpile.</passage>
<question type="YNQ">Does the US Department of Defense (DOD) plan to secure all of Russia's CW stockpiles?</question>
<provenance type="unedited">/nisprofs/russia/fulltext/gaorpts/d03482.pdf.txt</provenance>
<answer id="1" polarity="false" force="plausible" source="linguistic">
<response>No.</response>
<because>Securing all stockpiles is equivalent to saying that 100% of stockpiles are secured.</because>
</answer>
</inference>

<inference id="lcch_0012">
<passage>Many of the chemical weapons storage facilities lack a basic automatic alarm system to warn of dangerous levels of
agent in the air. Hence, the greatest danger posed by Russia's CW stockpile is that people living near the storage sites will be exposed
to these agents.</passage>
<question type="YNQ">Do Russia's chemical weapons facilities have systems to detect the accidental release of chemical weapons?</question>
<provenance type="unedited">/NP_Review/vol06/63/black63.pdf.txt</provenance>
<answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="linguistic">
<response>No.</response>
<because>Accidental release of CW is one way that dangerous levels of CW can put into the air.</because>
</answer>
</inference>

<inference id="lcch_0013">
<passage>In 1986, the Soviet government constructed a demonstration destruction facility in Chapayevsk that utilized neutralization and incineration technology. The facility, which was designed to destroy 350 tons of nerve agent yearly utilizing hydrolysis followed by incineration, cost 50 million rubles and took more than three years to build.</passage>
<question type="YNQ">Has Russia built facilities for the disposal of chemical weapons in the past?</question>
<provenance type="unedited">/NP_Review/vol06/63/black63.pdf.txt</provenance>
<answer id="1" polarity="false" force="plausible" source="world">
<response>No.</response>
<because>A demonstration facility is a valid type of facility.</because>
</answer>
</inference>

<inference id="lcch_0014">
<passage>Russia currently lacks the necessary capacity to dispose of its chemical munitions.</passage>
<question type="YNQ">Does Russia possess the infrastructure necessary to destroy chemical weapons?</question>
<provenance type="unedited">/NP_Review/vol06/63/black63.pdf.txt</provenance>
<answer id="1" polarity="true" force="strict" source="linguistic">
<response>No.</response>
<because>Having a capacity to do something implies having the infrastructure to do something.</because>
</answer>
</inference>

<inference id="lcch_0015">
<passage>At Chapayevsk in the Samara Province, where lewisite and mustard gas were produced, tests performed in 19931994 reportedly found arsenic concentrations in the soil around the former plant to be 8,500 times the permissible concentration (two milligrams per kilogram); in areas of the surrounding town, they were two to ten times the permissible concentration.</passage>
<question type="YNQ">Is there evidence that Russia's chemical weapons programs have polluted Russia's environment?</question>
<provenance type="unedited">/NP_Review/vol06/63/black63.pdf.txt</provenance>
<answer id="1" polarity="false" force="plausible" source="world">
<response>No.</response>
<because>Pollution sometimes implies increase concentration of a pollutant.  Arsenic is often a pollutant.</because>
</answer>
</inference>

<inference id="lcch_0016">
<passage>Finally, and more importantly, Qadhafi has ordered kidnappings and both supported and employed international terrorism against Western nations.</passage>
<question type="YNQ">Has Libya sponsored acts of terrorism?</question>
<provenance type="unedited">/china/engdocs/dodproli/me_na.htm.txt</provenance>
<answer id="1" polarity="true" force="strict" source="linguistic">
<response>Yes.</response>
<because>Ordering, supporting, and employing terrorism are all ways to sponsor terrorism.</because>
</answer>
</inference>

<inference id="lcch_0017">
<passage>Russian scientists familiar with Moscow's chemical warfare development program have been publicizing information on a new generation of agents, sometimes referred to as "Novichoks." These scientists report that these compounds, some of which are binaries, were designed to circumvent the CWC and to defeat Western detection and protection measures. Furthermore, it is claimed that their production can be hidden within commercial chemical plants.</passage>
<question type="YNQ">Is Russia producing chemical weapons that can be concealed easily?</question>
<provenance type="unedited">/china/engdocs/dodpro01.pdf.txt</provenance>
<answer id="1" polarity="false" force="plausible" source="world">
<response>No.</response>
<because> Weapons designed to circumvent detection were designed to be concealed.  Concealing CW in commercial chemical plants is not considered to be difficult.</because>
</answer>
</inference>

<inference id="lcch_0018">
<passage>Tehran continues to seek considerable production technology, training, expertise, equipment and chemicals from entities in Russia and China that could be used to help Iran reach its goal [of] an indigenous nerve agent production capability.</passage>
<question type="YNQ">Does Iran want to be a self-sufficient producer of CW?</question>
<provenance type="unedited">/CountryProfiles/Iran/Chemical/2340_2965.htm.txt</provenance>
<answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
<response>Yes.</response>
<because>An entity that has a goal of achieving a certain state wants to bring about that state.</because>
</answer>
</inference>

<inference id="lcch_0019">
<passage>Early 1990s Iran reportedly acquires 120 tons of castor beans, used in the production of the toxin ricin.</passage>
<question type="YNQ">Is there evidence that Iran has attempted to produce ricin?</question>
<provenance type="unedited">/CountryProfiles/Iran/Biological/2308_2367.htm.txt</provenance>
<answer id="1" polarity="false" force="plausible" source="world">
<response>No.</response>
<because>Acquisition of a component of something is a necessary step in producing something.</because>
</answer>
</inference>

<inference id="lcch_0020">
<passage>Iran has ratified the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC) and publicly decried all forms of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). At the same time, it does have a very sophisticated biotechnology infrastructure that includes leading research facilities and trained personnel. It has also participated in several scientific exchanges with foreign experts.</passage>
<question type="YNQ">Does Iran have the infrastructure necessary to produce bioweapons?</question>
<provenance type="unedited">/CountryProfiles/Iran/Biological/2299.htm.txt</provenance>
<answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="linguistic">
<response>Don't know.</response>
<because>Having a biotechnology infrastructure does not always imply having the infrastructure necessary to produce BW.</because>
</answer>
</inference>

<inference id="lcch_0021">
<passage>8 January 1998 Iranian President Mohammad Khatami reaffirms his administration's desire to cooperate with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). He also declares that Iran is neither currently planning to build nuclear weapons nor will attempt to do so in the future, any nuclear technology will be applied to developing nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.</passage>
<provenance type="unedited">/CountryProfiles/Iran/Nuclear/1825_1875.htm.txt</provenance>
<question type="YNQ">Has Iran offered to cooperate with the IAEA?</question>
<answer id="1" polarity="true" force="strict" source="linguistic">
<response>Yes.</response>
<because>Declaring to cooperate is one way to offer to cooperate.</because>
</answer>
</inference>

<inference id="lcch_0022">
<passage>Russian officials do not deny research has continued but assert that it is for the purpose of developing defenses against chemical weapons, a purpose that is not banned by the CWC. Many of the components for new binary agents developed by the former Soviet Union are not on the CWC's schedules of chemicals and have legitimate civil applications, clouding their association with chemical weapons use. However, under the CWC, all chemical weapons are banned, whether or not they are on the CWC schedules.</passage>
<question type="YNQ">Is Russia still researching chemical weapons?</question>
<provenance type="unedited">/china/engdocs/dodprol2/fsu.htm.txt</provenance>
<answer id="1" polarity="false" force="strict" source="linguistic">
<response>No.</response>
<because>Researching CW can imply researching defenses against CW.  Public affirmation that CW research is ongoing can be seen as confirmation of active CW research program</because>
</answer>
</inference>

<inference id="lcch_0023">
<passage>Despite official statements by the governments of Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus that they are opposed to proliferation of NBC weapons and missiles, some sales have and are taking place.</passage>
<question type="YNQ">Is Russia selling NBC weapons?</question>
<provenance type="unedited">/china/engdocs/dodprol2/fsu.htm.txt</provenance>
<answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
<response>Don't know.</response>
<because>No evidence in this passage links Russia specifically to sale of missiles.</because>
</answer>
</inference>

<inference id="lcch_0024">
<passage> Libya has demonstrated a willingness to use its missile capabilities. In 1986, Qadhafi fired two Scuds at a U.S. facility on the Italian island of Lampedusa. This attack was conducted in retaliation for the U.S. bombing raid on Tripoli, which was carried out in the aftermath of Libyan terrorist activities in Germany. While the Scuds fell short of Lampedusa, they clearly illustrate how Qadhafi could use longer-range ballistic missiles to target NATO and Western interests in Europe and the Middle East.</passage>
<question type="YNQ"> Has Libya used any of its ballistic missiles?</question>
<provenance type="unedited">/data/www.cdiss.org/col99apr27.htm</provenance>
<answer id="1" polarity="true" force="strict" source="world">
<response>Yes.</response>
<because>Firing a ballistic missile is one way to use a ballistic missile.</because>
</answer>
</inference>

<inference id="lcch_0025">
<passage>Iran has an ambitious missile program, with SCUD B, SCUD C, and CSS-8 (a Chinese surface-to-surface missile derived from a surface-to-air missile) missiles in its inventory. Having first acquired SCUD missiles from Libya and North Korea for use during the Iran-Iraq war, the Iranians are now able to produce the missile themselves.</passage>
<question type="YNQ">Does Iran produce SCUD missiles domestically?</question>
<provenance type="unedited">/china/engdocs/dodprol2/meafrica.htm.txt</provenance>
<answer id="1" polarity="false" force="strict" source="world">
<response>Yes.</response>
</answer>
</inference>

<inference id="lcch_0026">
<passage>Iran first acquired SCUD-B ballistic missiles from Libya and North Korea and used them during the Iran-Iraq war.</passage>
<question type="YNQ">Did Libya have SCUD-B missiles?</question>
<provenance type="unedited">/china/engdocs/dodproli/me_na.htm.txt</provenance>
<answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
<response>Yes.</response>
<because>A country must have access to something before providing it to another country.</because>
</answer>
</inference>

<inference id="lcch_0027">
<passage>Libya has tried, with limited success, to develop its own indigenous missile, and to extend the range of its aging SCUD force for many years under the Al Fatah and other missile programs.</passage>
<question type="YNQ">Has Libya developed its own domestic missile program?</question>
<provenance type="unedited">/china/engdocs/dodpro01.pdf.txt</provenance>
<answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
<response>Don't know.</response>
<because>Limited success may or may not imply a successful domestic missile program.</because>
</answer>
</inference>

<inference id="lcch_0028">
<passage>Yet another delivery option would be to equip Libya's Su-24D "Fencer" advanced fighter aircraft with chemical bombs.77 Libya currently has
only a primitive capability to refuel such aircraft in mid-air, although it could potentially strike at Israel</passage>
<question type="YNQ">Does Libya have other means of delivering chemical weapons besides from fighter aircraft?</question>
<provenance type="unedited">/NP_Review/vol04/43/sinai43.pdf.txt</provenance>
<answer id="1" polarity="false" force="strict" source="linguistic">
<response>No.</response>
</answer>
</inference>

<inference id="lcch_0029">
<passage>On the other hand, Libya has declined to join the Chemical Weapons Convention, which was opened for signature in
January 1993 and entered into force on April 29, 1997</passage>
<question type="YNQ">Has Libya ratified the Chemical Weapons Convention?</question>
<provenance type="unedited">/NP_Review/vol04/43/sinai43.pdf.txt</provenance>
<answer id="1" polarity="true" force="strict" source="linguistic">  
<response>No.</response>
</answer>
<because>Ratification implies that the entity has not declined to join the convention.</because>
</inference>

<inference id="lcch_0030">
<passage>Libya remains a significant proliferation concern. Libyan leader Muammar Qadhafi has shown that he is willing and capable of using chemical weapons and missiles against his enemies.</passage>
<question type="YNQ">Would Libya use CW offensively?</question>
<provenance type="unedited">/china/engdocs/dodproli/me_na.htm.txt</provenance>
<answer id="1" polarity="false" force="strict" source="world">
<response>No.</response>
<because>Willingness to use weapons against enemies implies that offensive use is likely.</because>
</answer>
</inference>

<inference id="lcch_0031">
<passage>As with the other two plants, the Libyan government has claimed at various times that Tarhunah is a petrochemical complex or that the facility's tunnels are part of the Great Man-Made River Project to funnel water from Libya's southern acquifers to its coastal cities</passage>
<question type="YNQ">Does Libya acknowledge producing CW at its Tarhunah plant?</question>
<provenance type="unedited">NP_Review/vol04/43/sinai43.pdf.txt</provenance>
<answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
<response>No.</response>
<because>Claiming that Tarhunah is used for non-CW purposes implies that Libya has not acknowledged that it is a CW plant.</because>
</answer>
</inference>

<inference id="lcch_0032">
<passage>Indeed, Libya has already resorted to chemical warfare on a small scale as an assymetric response to conventional military inferiority. In 1987, Libya's military operation in Chad was near defeat following a series of dramatic reversals. When Chadian forces, with French support, launched a surprise attack on a military base inside Libya, Qadhafi ordered his forces to attack the Chadian troops by dropping Iraniansupplied mustard gas bombs from a transport aircraft.</passage>
<question type="YNQ">Has Libya ever used chemical weapons?</question>
<provenance type="unedited">/NP_Review/vol04/43/sinai43.pdf.txt</provenance>
<answer id="1" polarity="false" force="strict" source="world">
<response>No.</response>
<because>Mustard gas is a type of CW.  Dropping bombs is one way to use CW.</because>
</answer>
</inference>

<inference id="lcch_0033">
<passage>In April 1996, the U.S. announced that it had not ruled out using conventional weapons to stop Libya from completing what Washington claimed was a chemical weapons plant in Tarunah, near Tripoli. Libya has said the site is an irrigation project. Gaddafi said the missile would be developed to defend Libya against foreign aggression, including the threat of a nuclear attack.</passage>
<question type="YNQ"> Has the U.S. threatened to take military action against Libya's chemical weapons facilities?</question>
<provenance type="unedited">/MissileAbstracts/1996/m9606169.htm.txt</provenance>
<answer id="1" polarity="true" force="strict" source="world">
<response>Yes.</response>
<because>Use of conventional weapons is one way to take military action against a target.</because>
</answer>
</inference>

<inference id="lcch_0034">
<passage>If so, security experts believe that Libya is several years away from acquiring a militarily significant indigenous BW capability. Libya?s government strongly denies acquiring or producing BW.</passage>
<question type="YNQ">Has Libya admitted having stockpiles of biological weapons?</question>
<provenance type="unedited">/CountryProfiles/e1_libya_1.html.txt</provenance>
<answer id="1" polarity="false" force="plausible" source="linguistic">
<response>Yes.</response>
<because>Production and acquisition are the only two ways a country can build a stockpile of BW.</because>
</answer>
</inference>

<inference id="lcch_0035">
<passage>Since the late 1980's, blister and nerve agents have been produced at Rabta, but the production rate has been low, and plant is not being utilized due to fear of attack.</passage>
<question type="YNQ">Is Libya currently producing nerve agents at its plant in Rabta?</question>
<provenance type="unedited">/MissileAbstracts/1997/m9707922.htm.txt</provenance>
<answer id="1" polarity="false" force="strict" source="world">
<response>Yes.</response>
<because>Plants that are not being utilized cannot produce CW.</because>
</answer>
</inference>

<inference id="lcch_0036">
<passage>Libya claims it will not sign the CWC as long as other countries in the region possess NBC weapons. Libya almost certainly will keep its chemical warfare program as long as Qadhafi remains in power.</passage>
<question type="YNQ">Is Libya expected to sign the CWC?</question>
<provenance type="unedited">/china/engdocs/dodproli/me_na.htm.txt</provenance>
<answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
<response>No.</response>
<because>Other countries possess NBC weapons.  Other countries are not likely to give up their NBC weapon stockpiles.</because>
</answer>
</inference>

</root>




